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Abstract 
 
At the end of May 2019, European citizens will be called to elect their representatives 
to the European Parliament. These elections are both uncertain, as the situation in which 
they intervene is unique, and crucial because the European Union arguably faces one of the 
most acute legitimacy crises since the beginning of the European integration process. At 
the same time however, these elections also mark the 40th anniversary of the direct 
elections to the European Parliament and a balance of this experience appears to be in 
order. Against this background, this article proposes both a reflection on the evolution 
over the past fourty years, and some thoughts as to the way forward. In particular, it 
critically considers some of the solutions that have been put forward to improve 
democratic legitimacy within the European Union. 
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At the end of May of this year, Europeans will be called to elect their representatives to 
the European Parliament (EP). These elections will mark the 40th anniversary of the direct 
elections to the EP since, before 1979, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were 
always delegated Members of the national parliaments of the Member States. The 
conditions of these elections are particularly uncertain: the European integration process 
has recently gone through several and multiform crises, i.e. economic and migration crises, 
but also legitimacy crisis as illustrated by the Brexit vote. Populist parties are also on the 
rise in several European Member States, and far right and anti-establishment parties are 
expected to win 120 seats, i.e. 16%, in the next elections.I However, trust in the European 
Union (EU) is at record-high.II In parallel, ‘lead candidates’ – or Spitzenkandidaten – have 
been designated by (some) political parties in an attempt to inject more democracy in the 
election process : By voting for a specific political party, citizens now supposedly choose 
the future President of the European Commission. This procedure, which is similar to the 
one in place in parliamentary systems whereby the prime minister commonly stems from 
the parliamentary majority, was introduced for the first time during the last EP elections in 
2014 and will be reproduced in 2019.  
Those elections are also ‘first time’-elections in five regards.III 1). Provided that Brexit 
intervenes on 29 March as scheduled – or soon thereafter –, they will be the first European 
elections ever organised after the exit of a Member State; the influence this may have on 
voters is difficult to predict, and it could either go in favour or against the EU. 2). These 
elections appear to be more Europeanised, as they do not only have a national focus as had 
been the case of previous elections. This may not be true of all Member States, but it is of 
at least some of the Western ones as is visible in the way in which the media depict these 
elections. 3). For the first time over the past 25 years, the majority in place, i.e. the Grand 
coalition, will most likely not be maintained after May of this year. The consequences of 
this change are hard to predict, although it can be anticipated that a coalition of three 
groups will be necessary to pass a piece of legislation, which will eventually set the third, 
smaller party, in a strong position to impose its will. 4). It is also the first time that five of 
the main European figures will have to be designated at the same time. Indeed, it is not 
only the President of the Commission that needs to be chosen, but also the President of 
the EP, the President of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European Central Bank 
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(whose nomination does not normally intervene simultaneously). 5). Finally, it is also the 
first time that Germany is a serious candidate to obtain two of these five high-level 
positions, i.e. the Presidency of the Commission (Manfred Weber) and the Presidency of 
the European Central Bank (Jens Weidmann). While it is highly unlikely that these two 
persons will obtain these positions, the fact that no German citizen has ever presided over 
the European Central Bank and that the last German President of the European 
Commission was Walter Hallstein points towards difficult political negotiations.  
Against this background, a reflection on the EP as an institution and on how it has 
evolved since its creation appears to be in order (I), as is an analysis of the open questions 
immediately prior to the upcoming elections (II). 
 
1. From the Parliamentary Assembly to today’s EP 
 
The EP is the result of the evolution of the Parliamentary (or Common) Assembly first 
created in the Coal and Steel Community Treaty which became the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the European Economic Community after the Treaty of Rome. As 
mentioned, its members were MPs delegated from the parliaments of the Member States, 
even if direct elections had always been envisaged as a possible alternative. An agreement 
in this sense could finally be reached in 1974 at a time when the intergovernmental aspect 
of the European integration process was also reinforced by means of the creation of the 
European Council. Following this decision, the first direct elections were organised in 
1979. A dual mandate remained possible until 2002, i.e. a politician could be elected both 
as an MP and as an MEP, but in practice, the number of MEPs who also held a national 
parliamentary mandate decreased rapidly. MPs who were also sitting in Strasbourg prior to 
the introduction of the direct elections largely failed to ‘Europeanise’ their counterparts as 
the diffusion of information among MPs related to the European integration process that 
could have intervened through them generally failed to materialise. In this sense, the 
introduction of the direct elections arguably did not represent a major change for those 
MPs that were not also sitting in Strasbourg. This de facto isolation of (most) MPs from the 
European dossiers is also related to the absence of institutional adaptation by national 
parliamentary chambers with a view to scrutinising European affairs. Some exceptions 
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existed, but they generally did not have any dedicated structures during the first decades of 
the integration process, so that even where they received information, no adequate 
structure allowed them to process it. With the introduction of the direct elections in 1979 
however, some parliaments, among which for instance the French one, started to mobilise 
and to create ad hoc structures and procedures. This notwithstanding, these arrangements 
remained largely imperfect in numerous parliaments until the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Differences existed, but overall a strong imbalance in favour of national executives, 
i.e. governments, could be observed to the detriment of parliaments which were not 
sufficiently associated to the European decision-making process. 
In parallel, the Parliamentary Assembly, and later the EP, was progressively reinforced. It 
ceased to be merely a consultative assembly and became a co-legislator in a growing 
number of areas. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the EP is a co-legislator in almost all policy 
domains, and it has acquired numerous additional rights. Despite the crucial role the EP 
now plays, fewer and fewer European citizens vote for the European parliamentary 
elections, although some disparities exist across Member States. This is one of the 
challenges that urgently needs solving. 
 
2. Contemporary challenges 
 
The EP is not the only parliamentary institution facing important challenges; Some 
have pointed to an overall tendency towards ‘deparliamentarisation’ (Tapio and Hix 2000: 
144f.), and we observe a loss of confidence in public institutions generally.IV Within the 
EU, citizens’ trust in EU institutions is globally higher than their levels of trust in their own 
national institutions.V This notwithstanding, the levels of participation in EP elections has 
kept decreasing since 1979,VI which points to a certain paradox. In any event, the supposed 
democratic deficit characterised by a detachment from the European arena and by a lack of 
trust only represents part of a more complex reality whose components vary, and differ 
across Member States. Be this at it may, 40 years after the introduction of the direct 
elections, this change has clearly failed to make citizens identify to this supranational 
institution (Barrett 2018: 3). They do not feel it as their own even if it is precisely the EP 
that is supposed to represent citizens directly at Union level (art. 10-2 Treaty of the EU) 
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and to guarantee the democratic character of the European decision-making process. There 
is additionally certainly a broader issue of representativity in an ever larger, more diverse 
and more differentiated EU (Curtin and Fasone 2017). To name only one of the most well-
known illustrations of this problem: how is the EP supposed to guarantee the democratic 
legitimacy of decisions affecting the Eurozone in view of its composition? Is it even in a 
position to fulfil this role? Should other mechanisms of representation be developed 
instead? Which form should they take? Any further complexity additionally bears the risk 
of leading to an ever-greater lack of understanding by citizens. 
The fact that European elections continue to operate under a national logic adds to this 
issue of adequate democratic representation in a fragmented EU. Even if the various 
national political parties are aggregated under broader European political groups, 
significant differences remain among them thereby leading to heterogeneous groups.VII  
To solve these issues, several solutions have been considered, and have even already 
materialised for some of them. 
Indeed, there have been numerous and recurrent calls for the creation of a second (or 
third) parliamentary chamber composed of delegated MPs at European level. Such a 
reform would admittedly increase the complexity of the EU institutional system, and could 
render it even more alien to ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, it has some potential, provided 
that it is conducted alongside broader reforms of the institutional system in place, to avoid 
a duplication of functions with the EP or with the Council for instance. A second 
parliamentary chamber would allow for a better participation of national parliaments in the 
European decision-making procedures, and it would contribute to make European matters 
less alien to MPs. By the same token, current issues existing in terms of interparliamentary 
cooperation between national parliaments, and between them and the EP could be 
resolved. This would enhance democratic legitimacy in a multi-tier EU.  
Transnational lists have also been envisaged as a solution to the currently existing 
problems, even if MEPs themselves rejected this idea. This is with no doubt a proposal 
worth examining, as it could contribute to the creation of a true European public sphere 
and to achieving more homogeneity within political groups. However, several issues could 
hinder those positive consequences: European citizens already feel largely distanced from 
their MEPs, and it can be anticipated that this distance would grow even further, were they 
to elect MEPs from a Member State other than that of their nationality. In this sense, the 
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linguistic issue is also likely to play a key role as those MEPs would need to campaign in 
several Member States whose languages they presumably do not master. Finally, if only 
some of the MEPs were to be elected on the basis of those transnational lists, an imbalance 
between them and the rest of the MEPs would appear, and would require at least some 
specific safeguards. In sum, transnational lists do not represent a miracle solution to the 
issues the EP is currently facing but with some specific safeguards, they could bear some 
potential.  
In contrast, the Spitzenkandidaten procedure should urgently be abandoned for a series of 
political and legal reasons. Politically, binding the nomination of the Commission President 
to the result of the EP elections appears to be particularly risky in a context in which 
Euroscepticism and extreme parties are on the rise. This is all the more true as this 
procedure has been used by those same parties to delegitimise the Commission and its 
actions. Beyond this, the question can be asked as to whether a Commission President 
representing a group that has obtained only a few additional percentage-points than the 
next group will truly benefit from an increased democratic legitimacy among citizens. It is 
indeed unlikely that a clear majority will arise from the upcoming elections. Furthermore, 
how can a politicised Commission only be headed by a politicised President while 
Commissioners continue to be designated without taking the majority in the EP into 
account? The question also arises as to why of all the key figures existing within the EU 
only the Commission President should be chosen on the basis of the results of the 
elections, while the others continue to be picked by the Member States. All Commissions 
so far have admittedly shown an element of politicisation, even if President Juncker was 
perhaps the most vocal in admitting this fact. Yet, the Commission’s function within the 
EU institutional system is to act as the Guardian of the Treaties. If it is too politicised and 
is thus perceived as less neutral, it is likely to lose its legitimacy vis-à-vis Member States to 
bring an action against one of them before the Court of Justice. Such an evolution is more 
dangerous today than ever before: the EU acutely needs a strong, neutral arbiter who 
makes sure that its rules and its values are respected. 
Last but not least: this procedure did not have the positive impact anticipated in 2014 
as turnout further decreased in that year. It could be argued that this might have been due 
to citizens’ not knowing the procedure yet; it remains though that this is not an 
encouraging sign. Actually, political groups themselves do not seem fully convinced by this 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
101 
procedure, as not all of them have nominated one lead candidate in 2019. Taking all these 
factors into consideration, the possibility exists that this procedure will do more harm than 
good: there is no guarantee that the lead candidate of the parties would eventually be 
chosen as Commission President, mainly because other positions have to be filled at the 
same time, and because Member States may not be ready to automatically designate a 
candidate they do not approve of.  
Looking ahead… 
Instead of constantly looking for solutions to the perceived democratic deficit in form 
of institutional reforms, perhaps the EU, and its Member States, should start by improving 
the way in which information related to the European integration process is communicated 
to citizens. Citizens’ knowledge of the EU should also be improved, for instance by means 
of dedicated educational programmes in schools and for the general public. MPs and 
MEPs should also cooperate more and better.  
 
                                                 
 A large part of these ideas were presented at the workshop ‘Les élections européennes : quatre enjeux en 
perspective’ organised at Sciences Po Paris on 5 February 2019 and I take this opportunity to thank the 
participants for their insightful comments. 
 Assistant professor of European Law, Maastricht University. Email: 
Diane.fromage@maastrichtuniversity.nl.  
I Politico, Projected composition of the next EU parliament (18 February 2019), 
https://www.politico.eu/2019-european-elections/.  
II European Commission, Press release ‘Spring 2018 Standard Eurobarometer: One year ahead of the 
European elections, trust in the Union and optimism about the future is growing’, 14 June 2018, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4148_en.htm.  
III These features were underlined by Enrico Letta during the workshop ‘Les élections européennes : quatre 
enjeux en perspective’ organised at Sciences Po Paris on 5 February 2019. 
IV Standard Eurobarometer 89, Spring 2018, 41f. 
V 42% of citizens trust the EU, whereas an average of 34% trusts their national governments and parliaments. 
Standard Eurobarometer 89, Spring 2018, 12. 
VI European Parliament, ‘Results of the 2014 elections‘, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-
results/en/turnout.html.  
VII Suffice it to think about the Fidesz party within the European Peoples’ Party for instance. 
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